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2. Introduction 
In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to intervene in Kosovo to 
prevent the Serbians from massacring the Albanian population. Although the conflict started 
in the early 1990s as Yugoslavia began to collapse - and the problems might even be traced 
back as far as the twelfth century - Kosovo only appeared on NATO's agenda in January 1998 
(De Wijk, 2000, 23-24, 33-35, 53-54). As tensions and violence increased between the 
Kosovo Albanians - seeking independence - and the Serbians - who wished to keep 
Yugoslavia intact - NATO tried to non-forcibly coerce Serbia to back down (De Wijk, 2000, 
32-35, 54). Despite NATO's threats to use force, the violence in Kosovo increased and a great 
humanitarian tragedy was looming. After a last attempt at negotiating a settlement in 
Rambouillet, the Transatlantic Alliance initiated an airstrike campaign on 24 March 1999, 
officially aimed at stopping the Serbians from massacring Albanians in Kosovo (De Wijk, 
2000, 68, 81-82). Although the Netherlands was hardly involved in the political negotiations, 
its military contribution to the NATO intervention amounted to the second largest of the 
participating European states (De Wijk, 2000, 18-19).  
 Twelve years later, another humanitarian tragedy emerged in Libya, and again NATO 
launched an airstrike campaign. This time, however, the Netherlands decided not to contribute 
to the bombings. In February 2011, the wave of protests that swept through North Africa and 
the Middle East had reached Libya, where it was met by the Gaddafi regime with brute force 
(Michaels, 2014, 18-19). Incidents of mass killings and atrocities were soon reported, as the 
Gaddafi regime committed crimes against humanity in an attempt to remain in power (Dunne 
& Gelber, 2014, 334-335). On 17 March, the United Nations (UN) Security Council approved 
Resolution 1973, which authorized military action to protect civilians in Libya; and on 19 
March a coalition of the willing initiated airstrikes against Gaddafi's troops (Michaels, 2014, 
21-22). Initially, NATO only got involved to establish an arms embargo and a no-fly zone, 
but the realization that a no-fly zone required the elimination of Libyan air defense units got 
NATO involved in the airstrikes as well (Michaels, 2014, 22-23). By 31 March, NATO was in 
full command of the airstrike campaign, which was officially aimed at protecting the Libyan 
population (Michaels, 2014, 25, 27). Since the operation lacked sufficient aircraft for the 
ground attacks and the Netherlands had suitable aircraft at its disposal, both NATO and the 
United States (US) directly appealed to the Netherlands to contribute more (Michaels, 2014, 
28-29). Nevertheless, the Netherlands limited its contribution to the NATO-led airstrike 
campaign, and only participated in non-combat operations. 
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 In this article, a controlled comparison will be made between the Dutch decision to 
participate in the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the Dutch decision not to intervene in 
Libya in 2011. The military operations in Kosovo and Libya were both led by NATO. Both 
campaigns were limited to aerial operations only - with no 'boots on the ground'
1
 - and, 
moreover, both campaigns were aimed at preventing civilians from being killed (De Wijk, 
2000, 81-82; Michaels, 2014, 18-29). Despite these similarities, the Netherlands decided to 
participate in one military intervention, but not the other. By comparing these two similar 
cases of which only one resulted in an actual military contribution, a better understanding can 
be gained of why small states choose to participate in military operations. The main question 
this article will attempt to answer is therefore the following: why did the Netherlands 
participate in the NATO-led airstrike campaign in Kosovo in 1999, but not in the NATO-led 
airstrikes in Libya in 2011? 
 The relatively large Dutch contribution to the operation in Kosovo and the fact that the 
Netherlands could have supplied the aircraft that the operation in Libya lacked, indicate that 
the contribution of small states to multinational interventions can be meaningful. However, 
when a regional conflict or a civil war leads to an intervention by an international coalition, 
the decision to intervene is frequently explained from the perspective of the major powers, as 
these are usually the primary interveners (Regan, 2010, 466). And since small states cannot 
defend themselves - the assumption goes - their foreign policy is the result of the actions of 
the greater military powers (Doeser, 2011, 222-223). The Netherlands for example, joined the 
United States in the Korean War in the early 1950s, it took part in the US-led intervention in 
Iraq in the early 1990s, and recently it joined the international coalition against the Islamic 
State in Iraq, which was again initiated by the US (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 230, 232).
2
 It 
appears as though the major powers lead, and the small states follow. This has left the foreign 
policy of small states as an underdeveloped field of study, and only in the last decades has it 
started to gain appreciation (Doeser, 2011, 222-223). The Dutch decisions regarding the 
interventions in Kosovo and Libya demonstrate that small states decide for themselves 
whether they participate in military interventions. And although some recent studies attempt 
to explain why small states participate in military interventions, a better understanding of 
small states' foreign policy could be gained by also studying the decision not to intervene. 
                                                          
1
 There were some ground troops deployed in Libya, who mainly armed and trained the local rebel forces. 
However, these units consisted of special forces that were dispatched nationally (mainly by the United Kingdom 
and France), and were not part of the NATO campaign (Larrabee et al., 2012, 98).  
2
 "Inzet F-16's en bijna 400 militairen vanwege strijd tegen ISIS" Ministerie van Defensie (24 September 2014). 
Available at http://www.defensie.nl/actueel/nieuws/2014/09/24/inzet-f-16%E2%80%99s-en-bijna-400-militairen 
-vanwege-strijd-tegen-isis. [Accessed 9 May 2015]. 
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 Four theories will be applied in order to answer the question why the Netherlands 
contributed to the airstrike campaign in Kosovo but not in Libya. From a neorealist 
perspective, the decision to participate is expected to be determined by the perceived threat 
linked to the two conflicts. Neoliberal institutionalism explains participation as the result of 
the value the Netherlands - as a unitary actor - attributed to NATO as an institution. The other 
two theories emphasize possible domestic factors explaining participation: according to 
utilitarian liberalism the decision to contribute to the intervention depended on the perceived 
public opinion of the Dutch electorate regarding participation in the airstrike campaigns, 
while liberal constructivist predictions highlight the ideological backgrounds of the parties in 
Cabinet and the compromise they struck in the coalition agreement as determinants of military 
contribution. These four approaches will be covered in more detail in the theoretical section, 
in which the hypotheses that are to be tested are also defined. First, however, an overview will 
be provided of the existing literature regarding the decision-making process leading to 
participation in military operations.  
 Following the literature review and the before mentioned theoretical section, the 
research design, case selection and operationalization are discussed in the methods section. 
Here, the application of the controlled comparison is explained, and the findings are then 
reported in the subsequent results section. The data suggests that only the neorealist 
hypothesis and the second liberal constructivist hypothesis can be confirmed. This means that 
the main differences between the two cases are that Kosovo was perceived to pose a bigger 
threat than Libya, and that the 1999 coalition agreement was more supportive of Dutch 
participation in military operations than the coalition agreement of 2011. The causal 
mechanisms between these findings and the different policy outcomes are then identified in 
the process tracing section. The article concludes with a brief overview of the study, together 
with a discussion of the results. 
 
3. Literature review 
Interstate conflicts have become a rare occurrence after the Second World War, yet Western 
nations are still often militarily involved in distant countries. These conflicts are mainly 
intrastate wars, or civil wars, and the decision of foreign powers to intervene in these conflicts 
has been an object of study from many different perspectives. A large-N approach is 
frequently applied by realist scholars, attempting to find the explanatory factors of military 
intervention in intrastate wars in general. Renato Corbetta (2010), for example, used a large 
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dataset covering intervention and non-intervention in ongoing conflicts from 1946 to 2001 to 
study joining behavior. Building on realist and balance of power theories, he finds that the 
main predictors of a state joining a military intervention are military capabilities, the distance 
between the state and the conflict, and the ties the state has with both the state in conflict and 
the main intervening state (Corbetta, 2010, 75, 80). In a similar large-N study to identify the 
predicting factors of third state intervention, Michael Findley and Tze Kwang Teo (2006, 835) 
stress the importance of alliances with both the state in conflict and intervening states. 
Another example of large-N analyses is Patrick Regan's (1998) study on how the specific 
characteristics of the conflict affect the chances of a military intervention taking place. These 
characteristics - including the number of casualties per year, the number of refugees, the 
number of countries that share a border with the state in conflict, and whether the conflict 
occurred during the Cold War - were found to all have an effect of the likelihood of an 
intervention to occur (Regan, 1998, 770-771).  
 These large-N analyses have been used to test other theoretical approaches as well. 
Liberal scholars have sought to explain the participation in military interventions as the result 
of institutional ties, the public opinion or the ideological backgrounds of the ruling parties. 
Sarah Kreps (2010), for instance, studied the influence of public opinion and the institutional 
pressures within NATO in the decision making of the states that were involved in the NATO 
operations in Afghanistan. She argues that low public support for participation in these 
operations was outweighed in most countries by the institutional ties within NATO (Kreps, 
2010, 202-203). Another example is Jürgen Schuster and Herbert Maier's (2006) study on the 
support of European states for the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. They tried to identify 
correlations between the different policies the European states adopted on the US-led invasion 
on the one hand, and the public opinion regarding the invasion and the ideological 
background - in terms of 'left' and 'right' - of the political parties in the governments of those 
European countries on the other hand (Schuster & Maier, 2006, 223-224). The problem with 
these large-N approaches, however, is that they merely indicate the predictive value of the 
tested factors. They might relate geographical distance, the existence of alliances or the 
support for an intervention in the public opinion to the likelihood of a state to intervene, but 
they cannot explain how these factors actually influence the decision-making process. They 
do not indicate, for example, to what extent geographical distance would shape a 
policymaker's decision on one specific military intervention, or how much this factor would 
matter compared to the alternative explanations. 
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 These limitations are to some degree reduced in single-case studies, in which a single 
decision to participate in a military operation is analyzed in-depth. By focusing on one case, 
the causal mechanisms in the decision-making process can be uncovered and the relative 
influence of different factors can be traced. Frequently, these studies focus on specific 
domestic factors that are more difficult to include in large-N approaches. One example is role 
theory and national role conceptions. According to this theory, introduced by Kal Holsti 
(1970), the conceptions of the decision makers about the roles their states fulfill can be used 
to explain and predict the foreign policies of those states. If the state is perceived to be a 
neutral state by the decision makers, non-intervention would be expected; but when it is 
perceived as a faithful ally it is more likely to participate in an intervention initiated by its 
allies. These national role conceptions can be determined by studying foreign policy 
statements, and one state can have several different roles at the same time (Holsti, 1970, 253-
256). An example of the application of role theory is Mischa Hansel and Kai Oppermann's 
(2014) study of German non-participation in the military operation in Libya in 2011. They 
concluded that the national role conceptions of the minister of foreign affairs, in particular his 
beliefs on the use of military force, played a prime role in the decision not to participate in the 
intervention (Hansel & Oppermann, 2014, 9, 16).  
 However, there might not be a consensus among the policymakers on one particular 
role conception (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012, 6). Klaus Brummer and Cameron Thies (2014, 18) 
argue that role conceptions might be different for each political party in parliament, by which 
they choose to connect role theory to the coalition politics approach. In the Netherlands, 
foreign policy is not determined by a single authority, but instead involves actors from 
different political parties (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 139, 247-248). The coalition politics 
approach studies how this need for internal consensus affects the foreign policy of a state. 
This can be done by comparing states governed by a multiparty coalition with states governed 
by single parties (see for example Kaarbo and Beasley, 2008), but usually involves an 
analysis of specific cases of foreign policy decisions, such as in George Dimitriu and Beatrice 
de Graaf's (2014, 17) study on the Dutch contribution to the mission in Afghanistan.  
 Although these examples of single-case studies offer a better insight into the causal 
mechanisms and the relative influence of alternative explanations, they, too, are not without 
limitations. Where large-N analyses struggle to explain specific cases of participation in 
military operations, single-case studies are often incapable of finding explanations that could 
be applied to other cases as well. One of the reasons for this lack of external validity is that 
these single-case studies are limited to instances of participation in interventions and exclude 
8 
cases of non-participation. This means that they might underestimate the factors determining 
non-participation - or overstate the explanations for participation (George & Bennett, 2005, 
22-25). A controlled comparison of two cases that are similar in most aspects except for the 
dependent variable and the independent variables of interest, could alleviate this shortcoming. 
Comparing the Dutch participation in the Kosovo bombings with the Dutch non-participation 
in the Libya airstrike campaigns gives more detailed insights into the decision-making process 
than a large-N analysis would, while it also gives a better indication of why small states 
participate in military operations than a single-case study would. Furthermore, this 
comparison will include a multitude of theoretical approaches. Instead of testing just one or 
two theoretical explanations, a controlled comparison is capable of including more 
explanatory factors than the studies mentioned above. 
 
4. Theoretical Section 
To explain why the Netherlands did participate in the airstrike campaign in Kosovo in 1999, 
but not in the airstrike campaign in Libya in 2011, four theoretical approaches will be used. 
The first of these approaches - neorealism - is derived from the realist school, while the other 
three - neoliberal institutionalism, utilitarian liberalism and liberal constructivism - can be 
seen as part of the broader liberal research program.
3
 These four approaches have been 
selected for this research since they include those explanations that are derived from the main 
theories in International Relations (Schuster & Maier, 2006, 224), and because they include 
factors that are particularly relevant in explaining the decision-making process in the 
Netherlands. An example of an explanation that has been excluded from this research is the 
psychological approach, which focuses on the leadership style or the personality traits of a 
political leader (see for example Dyson, 2006; Hermann, 2005). An approach which focuses 
on individuals is less relevant in the case of the Netherlands, because the Dutch political 
system is characterized as consensus-seeking - in which "decisions are not taken, but 
negotiated" (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 247); where the prime minister is merely a primus inter 
pares; and where "[t]here is no place for power concentrated in an individual" (Harmsen, 
                                                          
3
 These approaches, however, have been given different names by different scholars. The term utilitarian 
liberalism, for instance, is not used in The Logic of Political Survival, although the authors essentially describe 
the same phenomenon (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The labels that are used here have been chosen since 
they relate the theoretical approaches more clearly to the broader research programs and because they are less 
specific than some of the alternative names that are used in other literature, which allows the approaches to 
include theories that are similar. Liberal constructivism, for example, includes aspects of both role theory and 
coalition politics theory, as these theories both expect policy decisions to depend on the ideological backgrounds 
of the parties in Cabinet. 
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1999, 93). Thus, the approaches that are used do not include all possible explanations of 
foreign policy decisions, but they do cover the most influential and the most relevant 
explanations for Dutch participation in military interventions. 
 
4.1 Neorealism 
One of the factors that is traditionally expected to explain participation in military 
interventions is the nature of the conflict in which the intervention will take place. The 
characteristics of the conflict itself, such as its severity, the region in which it occurs or the 
actors that are involved, could be expected to influence the decision to participate in a military 
intervention. The theory that explains decision making regarding military intervention as the 
result of the specific conflict in which it would take place, is neorealism. By viewing states as 
self-interested actors (Andreatta, 2011, 27), neorealism predicts the decision to participate in 
an intervention to depend on how the conflict is perceived. The more a conflict is perceived to 
be damaging the intervening state's national interest, the more likely the state is to decide to 
intervene.  
 The neorealist approach assumes that the international arena is shaped by states as the 
dominant actors, with no existence of a higher authority than the state (Andreatta, 2011, 27). 
This means that the international arena is anarchical, in which each state has to fend for itself 
in order to survive. As a result, states - which are considered to be unitary, rational and self-
interested actors - are inclined to mistrust each other and to consider other states as potential 
security threats (Andreatta, 2011, 27). In light of these assumptions, it seems as though 
neorealism might struggle to explain participation in the airstrike campaigns in Kosovo and 
Libya, as both operations were led by an interstate alliance. Although alliances seem to be 
contradictory to the concepts of anarchy and mistrust, neorealism has an explanation for their 
existence as well. The main purpose for a state to commit to a military alliance, such as 
NATO, is to improve its position vis-à-vis a security threat (Walt, 2009, 86). During the Cold 
War, NATO served to balance against the Soviet Union and the commitment to this military 
alliance strengthened a state's security position.  
 As the Cold War ended, however, commitment to NATO could no longer be explained 
solely by the protection it provided against the Soviet threat. Instead, commitment to NATO 
after the Cold War is explained by neorealist theory as an act of bandwagoning, in which 
weaker states use the hegemony of the US to their own benefit - and the US uses its 
hegemonic position to influence the policies of weaker states (Waltz, 2000, 25-26). Although 
this reasoning explains the persistence of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it 
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struggles to account for why the Netherlands did participate in the NATO-led airstrike 
campaign in Kosovo, while in Libya it supported the operation but refused to use force. The 
hegemonic power position of the US might explain the NATO-membership of the 
Netherlands, but it cannot explain why a NATO member state would selectively contribute to 
NATO-led interventions. To explain these different decisions, neorealism looks at the 
characteristics of the conflict itself. 
 As neorealism assumes that states are rational, unitary actors who seek to further their 
self-interest, the approach relates the decision to intervene in a conflict to the effects the 
conflict has for the state's national interest. These interests are predominantly limited to 
security considerations, as the state's basic motive is survival (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, 10). 
While the Soviet Union was the main security threat that influenced a state's commitment to 
NATO during the Cold War, the security considerations that, according to neorealism, 
determine a state's participation in interventions during the post-Cold War era stem from the 
conflicts themselves. In other words, the reaction of a state to a specific conflict is determined 
by the degree at which that conflict is considered to be damaging to the national security. If 
the conflict poses no threat at all, the response is more likely to be of a diplomatic nature or 
even non-existent; while military action is more likely to be the response to a larger security 
threat. According to this logic, the perceived national security threat is thus expected to have 
been higher in the case of Kosovo in 1999 than in the case of Libya in 2011. Hypothesis 1 is: 
the Dutch government perceived the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 to be a bigger threat to its 
national security than the conflict in Libya in 2011. 
 
4.2 Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Where neorealism views alliances as ad hoc means for states to respond to security threats, it 
is also possible to conceive alliances - particularly long lasting ones such as NATO - as being 
more than just defensive pacts. According to neoliberal institutionalism, alliances are 
institutions whose effects are not merely limited to security considerations, as they also 
reduce the transaction costs - i.e. the time and effort it would take to create and maintain any 
agreement - between the participating actors (Keohane, 1988, 386). In practice, this means 
that NATO-membership not only provides security against external threats, but it also 
improves the conditions for further cooperation with fellow member states. Therefore, the 
neoliberal institutionalist approach explains the response of the Netherlands to the conflicts in 
Kosovo and Libya, not in light of their effects on the Dutch national security as the neorealist 
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approach does, but instead in light of the institutional context in which the response would 
take place.  
 The basic assumptions of neoliberal institutionalism are similar to those of neorealism: 
the approach assumes that international politics is dominated by states, which are unitary, 
rational actors that seek to further their self-interest, and that the international arena is 
anarchical - with no higher authority than the state (Hellmann & Wolf, 1993, 7). The main 
difference between the two approaches, however, is that according to neorealism, cooperation 
between states is hindered by the absence of a higher authority and also by the assumption 
that states value relative gains over absolute gains - which means that states would prefer not 
to cooperate and gain nothing, over a cooperation in which the state gains less than its partner 
- while neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states value absolute gains over relative gains 
and that cooperation can be established through institutions (Hellmann & Wolf, 1993, 7-8). 
Although the lack of a higher authority means that states are free to cheat and deceive others, 
and that states can thus not be certain that other states will live up to their promises, the 
neoliberal institutionalist approach argues that cooperation is still possible by reducing 
uncertainties through institutions. Institutions increase the costs of defecting from agreements, 
which reduces the risk of being cheated (Keohane, 1988, 386). The costs of the commitment 
to an institution are rewarded by the trust it creates with the other participating states. This 
self-interest is what drives states to create institutions, which only persist "as long as, but only 
so long as, their members have incentives to maintain them" (Keohane, 1988, 387).  
 From this neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the participation in NATO-led 
interventions should be seen as a state's commitment to an international institution. As states 
are rational actors, they should only be expected to create institutions when the anticipated 
benefits of the commitment - be they long term or short term - outweigh the costs (Keohane, 
1988, 387). The Dutch decision of whether or not to contribute to NATO-led airstrike 
campaigns is thus expected to depend on the perceived value of NATO for the Netherlands. 
This 'value' amounts to the gains it provides for the national security, as perceived by the 
Netherlands as a unitary actor. The assessment of this perceived value also includes other 
benefits, such as improved economic relations with other NATO-member states or the higher 
status that NATO can provide in international affairs. Moreover, as neoliberal institutionalism 
argues that states are the dominant actors in the international arena, their commitment to an 
institution is determined by the states themselves: states are able to reevaluate or reconsider 
their commitment to an institution at any time. Although commitment to an institution 
restrains a state's freedom of action - which helps creating the reputation of being a reliable 
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partner - a rational actor would only submit to such restrictions when "substantial common 
interests" can be realized (Keohane, 2005, 117, 258-259). A change in the anticipated benefits 
could thus lead to a change in the state's commitment. Therefore, the Dutch decision to 
participate in the airstrikes in Kosovo but not in the bombings in Libya would be the result of 
a decline in the anticipated benefits of the commitment to NATO as an institution. Hypothesis 
2 is: the Dutch government perceived NATO to be a more valuable institution for the 
Netherlands in 1999 than it did in 2011. 
 
4.3 Utilitarian Liberalism 
Instead of expecting a state's contribution to military interventions to be the consequence of 
external variables, it is also possible to explain the participation in interventions as the result 
of domestic factors. The state is then not conceived as a unitary actor, but instead the internal 
structure and dynamics of the state are believed to influence the decision making as well. 
Utilitarian liberalism argues that the decision to contribute to military interventions depends 
on the conditions within the Netherlands itself. As politicians presumably wish to remain in 
power, they avoid making decisions that could cost them their position (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., 2003, 8-9). Therefore, the policy outcomes are explained by utilitarian liberalism as the 
result of the influence of the public opinion. 
 This logic is closely related to rational choice theory, as it argues that policymakers are 
utility-maximizing - or rational - individuals who seek to gain the most by spending the least 
(Freund & Rittberger, 2001, 69-70). Utilitarian liberalism assumes that the policymakers' 
primary interest is political survival, since they first need to be in office to then be able to 
pursue any other goal (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 7). For political survival, the 
policymaker relies on a winning coalition in the 'selectorate'; in other words, of all those that 
are involved in the appointment of his office, the policymaker needs a majority to choose for 
him (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 7-8). In a nondemocratic state, the selectorate might 
consist of only a small political, economic or religious elite, and the policymaker would thus 
try to please the limited group of people that forms his winning coalition. In a democratic 
state, however, the selectorate consists of the entire electorate, which means that the winning 
coalition, that allows the policymaker to stay in office, consists of a large segment of society 
(Mattes et al., 2014, 3). In order to remain in power, the Dutch ministers thus need a majority 
of the electorate to vote for the coalition parties.
4
  
                                                          
4
 This is not the only requirement to remain minister in the Netherlands: the new Cabinet that is formed should 
again include the political party of the former minister and it is also not certain that the former minister will be 
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 As a result, the policymaker will choose the policy alternative that he believes is most 
appealing to the preferences of the electorate. Going against the will of the people (or at least 
a clear majority of the people) would reduce the likelihood of remaining in power. This 
should especially be the case when these policy options have a high public saliency, as in the 
case of military operations (Schuster & Maier, 2006, 228). The impact of the public opinion 
on the decision-making process can also be expected to be influenced by upcoming elections. 
However, the operations in Kosovo and Libya both occurred within the first year after 
parliamentary elections took place. Accordingly, utilitarian liberalism explains the Dutch 
contribution to the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo as the result of the perceived public support 
for these operations, while the restricted participation in the Libya-campaign would have been 
caused by low public support - or high public resistance. Hypothesis 3 is: Dutch policymakers 
perceived that the Dutch public opinion was more supportive of participation in the airstrike 
campaign in Kosovo in 1999, than of participation in the airstrike campaign in Libya in 2011. 
 
4.4 Liberal constructivism 
Utilitarian liberalism is not the only theoretical approach that explains decision making as the 
result of the policymakers' preferences. Instead of assuming that policymakers are utility-
maximizing individuals, it is also possible to conceive of them as driven by personal ideas and 
convictions. The difference between utilitarian liberalism and liberal constructivism lies in 
their explanation of why a policymaker chooses a certain policy alternative. Liberal 
constructivism is the theoretical approach that assumes that an individual's or a group's ideas, 
beliefs, norms and culture, define their preferences (Schuster & Maier, 2006, 230-231). 
Policymakers are thus expected to not automatically choose the policy option that maximizes 
utility, but instead choose the option that is most consistent with their personal worldviews. 
For example, this can take the shape of religious objections against military operations or of 
an ideological conviction that states have a responsibility to protect civilians. It also includes 
the policymakers' conceptions of the roles their state fulfills in the international arena, as 
defined in Holsti's (1970) role theory. 
 In the Netherlands, however, foreign policy is not determined by a single authority, 
but it is rather the outcome of a compromise between the different parties in Cabinet (Kaarbo, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
re-appointed as minister in this new Cabinet (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 126-131).  For instance, Kok II (the 
Cabinet led by Wim Kok from 1998 to 2002) only included 6 out of the 14 minister of Kok I (1994-1998) and 
only 3 of those ministers were appointed to the same ministry as in the previous Cabinet. However, to be 
reassigned as minister, and for the new Cabinet to again include the minister's political party, it is necessary for 
the coalition parties to gain a majority of the votes in the parliamentary elections in the first place. Winning the 
elections is always the first step to remain in power. 
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2012, 77-78). Instead of looking at the worldviews of each individual policymaker, it is thus 
possible to look at the convictions of the political party they belong to. Since the 1960s, the 
appointment of ministers and junior ministers in the Netherlands has become more partisan, 
as their selection is increasingly based on political experience rather than on technical 
expertise (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 142). Moreover, prior to the weekly Cabinet meetings, the 
ministers have to attend party meetings in order to reinforce party discipline (Andeweg & 
Irwin, 2009, 143-144). The policymakers can therefore be expected to act in accordance with 
the worldviews of their political parties. According to liberal constructivism, the preferred 
policy option in the Netherlands is thus expected to rely on the ideological background of the 
parties in power. Hypothesis 4 is: the parties in Cabinet in 2011 were more ideologically 
opposed to Dutch participation in an airstrike campaign than the parties in Cabinet in 1999. 
 However, no single party has ever reached a majority in parliamentary elections in the 
Netherlands, which means that the Dutch government is always shaped by multiparty 
coalitions (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 125). The need for the political parties in the Cabinet to 
compromise, leads to policy outcomes that do not always match the parties' initial 
preferences. This links liberal constructivism to the coalition politics approach, which 
assumes that the foreign policy of multiparty governments differs from that of single-party 
governments (Kaarbo & Beasley, 2008, 68). Each party in Cabinet has its own perspective on 
the relative importance of security threats, institutional ties, or the public opinion; which 
means that these factors might still influence the decision making, but the policy outcome is 
determined by how the parties in Cabinet agree to respond to them (Kaarbo, 2012, 5-6). When 
a coalition is formed in the Netherlands, the participating parties settle on a coalition 
agreement (or regeerakkoord) in which they bind themselves - and, more importantly, the 
other parties - to the compromise that has been struck. These coalition agreements cover all 
the issues the parties disagree on in detail, and they act like a "political contract that holds the 
coalition together" (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 129). The decision whether to contribute to 
NATO-led airstrikes should thus not only be expected to depend on the coalition parties' 
ideological stance towards such actions, but also on the compromise they were able to reach. 
Hypothesis 5 is: the coalition agreement of the Dutch Cabinet in 2011 was less supportive of 
participation in an airstrike campaign than the coalition agreement of the Cabinet in 1999.  
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5. Methods 
To find out which factors influenced the decision making in the two cases, a combination of 
the controlled comparison and the process tracing methods will be used. The most similar 
system design allows for a comparison that approaches an experimental setting. This study 
remains an exercise of social science, however, which inherently means that any two cases 
might not be similar enough to provide a strong test of the theories (Van Evera, 1997, 57-58). 
The controlled comparison method will therefore be combined with process tracing. Although 
process tracing provides a stronger test of the theories' explanatory power, it also requires 
more detailed information. In the case of decision making regarding the use of the military, 
such information might not be directly available. Relying solely on process tracing to study 
the causal mechanisms in the decision making might thus not be feasible. Instead, the 
controlled comparison method will allow for the identification of the factors that differed 
between the two cases. Using the process tracing method will then allow to link these factors 
to the decision making, by specifying the causal mechanisms between them. 
 
5.1 Case selection 
To identify the factors that drive small states to participate in military operations, two cases of 
Dutch decision making regarding the contribution to airstrike campaigns have been selected. 
By focusing on just these two cases, it is possible to study the relative influence of multiple 
factors in the decision-making process, instead of merely looking at the presence of a single 
factor in a large number of cases. Such a two-case comparison is possible when the cases are 
similar in many aspects, yet differ on the dependent variable and a limited number of 
independent variables of interest. This makes the comparison of one state across two points in 
time an attractive option, since a comparison of two different states would have to account for 
a larger number of differences - e.g. cultural, historical or geographical differences.  
 Furthermore, the military operations should also be similar in order to be compared. 
Comparing, for instance, a small state's (non-)participation in the US-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003 to its contribution to a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation in Africa would 
involve too many changing variables to give any meaningful insight into the decision-making 
process. This problem is limited in the cases of Kosovo and Libya, since they share some 
basic characteristics. Both operations took place within the same institutional context, as both 
were led by NATO, and both operations were limited to aerial operations without involving 
'boots on the ground'. Furthermore, both operations were aimed at preventing the killing of 
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civilians (De Wijk, 2000, 81-82; Michaels, 2014, 18-29). Nevertheless, the Netherlands 
participated in the bombings in Kosovo, but not in Libya.  
 Although there are some important differences between the two cases, this should not 
necessarily hamper the comparison. It can be argued that the decision making leading to the 
participation in the campaigns in Kosovo and Libya were influenced by the preceding military 
operations the Netherlands had contributed to. The UN-led and NATO-led operations in the 
former Yugoslavia that preceded the airstrike campaigns in Kosovo - especially UNPROFOR 
(United Nations Protection Force) in which Dutch peacekeepers failed to prevent the 
massacre of some 7,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica in 1995 (Power, 2002, 391-392) - could 
have affected the Dutch decision to contribute to the operation in Kosovo. By contrast, the 
airstrike campaign in Libya was preceded by the 'War on Terror', which had become both 
unpopular and controversial in the Netherlands (Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2014, 7). The argument 
would then be that the airstrike campaign in Kosovo was used by the Netherlands to make up 
for the events in the former Yugoslavia, while the Netherlands did not participate in the 
airstrike campaign in Libya because of the negative experiences of the War on Terror. To 
compare these two cases would thus be meaningless, as the situational factors determined the 
outcome of the decision-making process from the outset. Against this reasoning, however, 
three counterarguments can be made. 
 First, the argument that the Netherlands wanted to make up for past mistakes in 
Bosnia, and tried to prevent future atrocities at all costs, could equally apply to the Libyan 
case as well, as that operation was also aimed at preventing the killing of civilians. Second, 
the atrocities in Srebrenica could also be seen as a reason for the Netherlands to not be so 
eager to get involved in another military operation. Especially since the NATO-led campaigns 
in Kosovo were not based on a UN Security Council resolution, which made their legality 
"highly disputed" (Krieger, 2001, xxxiv). The operations in Libya, on the other hand, did have 
a sound legal basis through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (Michaels, 
2014, 21). Thus, participation in the disputed actions in Kosovo would not necessarily have 
been more sensible than a contribution to the authorized bombings in Libya. And third, the 
negative experiences of the War on Terror did not prevent the Netherlands to participate in the 
airstrike campaigns in Iraq against the Islamic State in 2014, merely three years after the 
Libya case. Apparently, the legacy of the War on Terror by itself, cannot explain non-
participation.  
 Together, these arguments indicate that the situational factors were not that much 
different in the two cases. This is not to say that there are no dissimilarities, but rather that 
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these dissimilarities do not hamper their comparison for this research. It is because of the 
similarities between the two cases that the comparison of the different policy outcomes could 
provide new insights into the motivations of small states to participate in military operations. 
It allows for the variables of interest to be isolated, while possible intervening or competing 
variables are held constant.  
 
5.2 Operationalization 
5.2.1 Neorealism 
According to the neorealist approach, the decisions whether or not to participate in the 
airstrike campaigns in Kosovo and Libya, depended on the perceived threat these conflicts 
posed to the Dutch national security. The focus of classical realism on states as unitary actors 
would suggest to measure the material capabilities and geographical proximity of Yugoslavia 
and Libya, to determine the threat they posed to the Netherlands. However, the NATO-led 
operations took place in intrastate conflicts in both countries, and were not aimed at 
preventing a possible interstate war between the Netherlands and Yugoslavia or Libya. 
Therefore, the perceived threat that will be measured for the first hypothesis, will instead 
consist of the indirect consequences of the conflicts for the Dutch national interests. The more 
the national interests, such as vital natural resources or key trade routes, were perceived to be 
at stake, the more the conflict was perceived to be threatening to the Netherlands. In order to 
determine these perceived national security threats, two measurements will be used. 
 First, the perceived threat level can be derived from expressions of the policymakers 
themselves (Cohen, 1978, 95).
5
 In the Netherlands, the ministers need to keep the parliament 
informed, in order to secure the parliament's vote of confidence (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 
153, 155). When the policymakers inform the parliament about the conflict in Kosovo or 
Libya, they explain why it is necessary for the parliament to be aware of the situation in these 
foreign countries. By comparing the ways in which the Kosovo conflict and the Libya conflict 
were described by the ministers to the parliament, it is possible to determine which conflict 
was perceived to pose a bigger threat to the national security. This is done by comparing the 
information that was provided through ministerial letters (or kamerbrieven), parliamentary 
debates, and so-called VAOs (Verslag Algemeen Overleg) - in which meetings of the 
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 Although the neorealist approach assumes states to be unitary actors, it can still be meaningful to look at the 
expressions of individual policymakers. When the state is seen as a unitary actor, this does not mean that the 
individual policymakers are irrelevant; instead it means that it does not matter who the policymakers are, as the 
state is central in international politics and each rational policymaker would come to the same conclusions given 
the circumstances (Heywood, 2011, 115). 
18 
parliamentary committee on foreign policy are discussed in parliament (Andeweg & Irwin, 
2009, 150-151, 155).
6
 These parliamentary documents can then be categorized in terms of the 
aspects of the conflict they focused on.  
 By differentiating the concerns that are expressed by the policymakers, the 
parliamentary documents can be divided into three categories: (1) humanitarian, (2) regional 
stability and (3) national interests. The first category is the one where the national security 
threat is perceived to be the lowest. It consists of the parliamentary documents in which the 
policymakers focus on the humanitarian situation or the violation of human rights in the 
conflict area. Although these aspects of a conflict can certainly be troublesome, they do not 
directly affect the Dutch national interest. The second category contains concerns of an 
escalation of the conflict. Here, the conflict is still not perceived as directly affecting the 
national interest, but the risk of spillover to neighboring countries gives it the potential to 
become a larger threat to the national security - e.g. it might spillover to states that are 
considered to be more powerful or more dangerous. The third category amounts to the highest 
perceived threat, as it consists of concerns about the national interest directly being at stake.  
 For the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya, each ministerial letter, parliamentary debate 
and VAO can be assigned to one or multiple of the categories - as multiple concerns can be 
expressed in one letter or debate. The resulting distributions of the parliamentary documents 
across the three categories can then be used to determine the perceived threat level of the 
conflicts. As the possibilities of different distributions is limited, they can be objectively 
separated into three classifications where the perceived threat is considered to be at a low, 
medium, or high level. This is done using the 'average' way in which the conflicts were 
described (for a detailed explanation see Appendix A). A low level of perceived threat is 
ascribed to the distributions that are the most skewed towards humanitarian concerns, while 
the distributions that are the most skewed towards national interests concerns indicate a high 
level of perceived threat. Although this classification is not necessarily required to determine 
which of the two conflicts was perceived as more threatening than the other, it does enable the 
results of this measurement to be combined with the results of the second measurement. 
 The second way of measuring how threatening the two conflicts were perceived to be, 
is through the annual reports of the Dutch general intelligence and military intelligence 
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 All of these parliamentary documents are publicly accessible at https://www.overheid.nl/. 
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agencies, the AIVD and MIVD (previously the BVD and MID).
7
 These agencies gather 
information on potential or actual security threats, to improve the capabilities of the 
policymakers to protect the state and its citizens. Although much of the intelligence agencies' 
activities remain classified, their annual reports provide an overview of the focal points of 
their activities and of the recent developments that pose a threat to the Dutch society 
(Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1999, 3). By analyzing the annual reports from the year in 
which the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya started, up until the year in which the airstrike 
campaigns commenced, an assessment can be made of how threatening these events were 
considered to be by the intelligence agencies. And, since the agencies' findings were reported 
to the policymakers at the time, this also gives an indirect indication of the policymakers' 
perceptions of the conflicts. 
 Unfortunately, the reports do not rank the security threats in order of magnitude, nor 
do they assign threat-levels to each conflict situation. To nevertheless be able to compare the 
perceived threat for different conflicts, two separate indicators can be used. First, the portion 
of the report that is dedicated to the conflict in Kosovo or Libya - in terms of the number of 
words as a percentage of the words in total - gives an indication of the threat-level of the 
conflict. The annual reports cover a variety of security issues - including global terrorism, 
migration and refugee flows, and organized crime within the Netherlands, to name but a few - 
and for each issue the main points of concern and the main sources of the threat are listed. 
Therefore, the more a single conflict or country is mentioned in the report and the larger the 
portion of the report that is devoted to that specific conflict or country, the more attention it 
had been given by the intelligence agencies. When the percentage is below 3.33 per cent the 
perceived threat will be considered to be at a low level, and when it is above 6.66 per cent it 
will be considered to be at a high level.
8
 Comparing the weight of the reports that are 
dedicated to the two conflicts is thus one indication of which conflict was perceived to be a 
bigger threat to the Netherlands.  
 The second way of determining the threat-level of the conflicts from the annual 
reports, is by looking at the number of different potential consequences the conflicts could 
have for the Netherlands. For example, during the Kosovo conflict, the AIVD reported that 
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 These abbreviations stand for Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, Militaire Inlichtingen en- Veilig-
heidsdienst, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst and Militaire Inlichtingendienst respectively. For the sake of 
simplicity, from here on these will only be referred to by their current names: AIVD and MIVD. 
8
 As the reports cover a large variety of topics, it is highly unlikely that more than 10 per cent of the words are 
devoted to any one subject. When the percentages below 10 are then divided into three ranges, this results in a 
classification of a low perceived threat when the percentage is below 3.33%, and a high perceived threat when 
the percentage is above 6.66%. Any percentage between these boundaries will be considered to be a medium 
perceived threat. 
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Albanian minorities were recruiting fighters in the Netherlands, which can be considered as 
one possible consequence of the conflict. The information about bomb threats that were 
received counts as another one (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1999, 23). However, each 
report varies in layout and structure, which means that one report might speak of 'multiple 
incidents of violence' where another addresses each incident individually. Therefore, when 
different reports mention the same consequence for one conflict, or when one consequence is 
mentioned multiple times within one report, it only counts once. The larger the number of 
different consequences that are listed, the higher the threat-level was perceived to be. With 
less than five consequences, the perceived threat will be considered to be at a low level, and 
with ten or more consequences it will be considered to be at a high level.
9
 
 A possible third indicator would have been the wording used to describe these 
consequences. However, the reports are all written in a rather neutral manner, in which 
observations are presented as facts and superlatives are rarely used. The slight differences in 
wording that do exist would result in a categorization that is too subjective to base any 
meaningful conclusions on. Furthermore, a categorization of the nature of the consequences - 
similar to how the concerns that are expressed in the parliamentary documents are categorized 
- would not improve the analysis of the annual reports, because the intelligence agencies only 
focus on matters that affect the national interests. 
 Finally, the assessment of the policymakers' expressions in the parliamentary 
documents can be combined with the analysis of the annual reports of the intelligence 
agencies, to determine to what extent the perceived threat level differed in the two cases. 
Individually, each indicator will point out one conflict to have been perceived as more 
threatening than the other. However, since the three separate indicators classify the perceived 
threat of a conflict as being at a low, a medium or a high level, the combination of these three 
indicators determines how much different the perceived threat was for the two conflicts. The 
more of the three indicators point in different directions, and the further the distance between 
those directions - e.g. low versus high instead of low versus medium - the more the threat of 
the two conflicts were perceived to be different. 
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 A conflict does not need to have any direct consequences to be mentioned in the annual reports, while ten or 
more different consequences is exceptional. If 10 or more consequences is then classified as a 'high' perceived 
threat, then 5 would divide the rest into equal groups, with 0-4 classified as 'low' and 5-9 classified as 'medium'. 
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5.2.2 Neoliberal institutionalism 
The neoliberal institutionalist approach expects a state's commitment to an institution to 
depend on the anticipated benefits of that institution for the state. The Dutch decision whether 
or not to contribute to NATO-led airstrike campaigns is thus expected to depend on the 
perceived value of NATO for the Netherlands. This 'value' amounts to the gains it provides 
for the national security, as perceived by the Netherlands as a unitary actor, and it also 
includes expected benefits in terms of economic relations with other member states or a 
higher status in the international arena. Comparing the perceived value of NATO in 1999 with 
the perceived value in 2011, can be done by examining the way the Dutch government 
evaluated NATO in its long-term policy plans. With NATO being a military alliance, its 
importance for the Netherlands is expressed in the defensienota: the long-term defense policy, 
or Grand Strategy, of the Netherlands. An analysis of these security strategies will provide the 
data to compare the perceived value of NATO for the Netherlands in 1999 and 2011. 
 Although each government makes its own 'short-term' defense policy about the 
available budget and the way the budget is distributed among the armed forces, the Grand 
Strategy covers the overarching objectives of the military and how these should be achieved. 
These long-term defense policies are occasionally amended, but they are only renewed 
roughly every decade (the last four are from 1984, 1991, 2000 and 2013). The security 
strategy of 1991, for example, aimed to "radically revise" the Dutch defense policy in 
response to the circumstances of the post-Cold War era - in which the need for a large 
defensive force had declined (Defensienota 1991, 1990-91, 5). The security strategy is thus 
not limited to the restructuring of the Dutch armed forces and to the planned cuts in defense 
expenditure; it also includes the Dutch policy towards international cooperation and an 
assessment of the expected necessity of multinational defense collaborations for the 
Netherlands.  
 These are the sections of the defensienota that will be analyzed to determine the value 
that is attributed to NATO. This can not only be done by comparing how they describe the 
importance of NATO in the security strategy, but also how NATO is addressed in relation to 
other forms of defense cooperation - such as the European Union (EU) or bilateral 
cooperation. The more NATO is described as an exceptionally important organization - 
instead of as 'just' being important - and the more the alternative organizations are described 
as subordinate to NATO, the higher the perceived value of NATO will be classified to be. 
Furthermore, if NATO was involved in the formation of the security strategy, then the 
perceived value is considered to have also been higher than when this was not the case. 
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 The new security strategy that was set out in the Defensienota 1991 - together with the 
additions of the 'priority document' of 1993 (the Prioriteitennota 1993) - remained in force 
until 2000, when it was replaced with the cleverly named Defensienota 2000. This renewed 
strategy was aimed to prepare the armed forces for the challenges of the twenty-first century 
(Defensienota 2000, 1999-2000, 18). Two main amendments were made to it in 2003 and 
2006 - with the Prinsjesdagbrief 2003 and the Actualiseringsbrief 2006 - and they remained 
in force until 2013. The Kosovo case will thus include the Grand Strategy set out in the 
Defensienota 1991 and the Prioriteitennota 1993, while the Libyan case will include the 
Defensienota 2000, the Prinsjesdagbrief 2003 and the Actualiseringsbrief 2006. All of these 
long-term defense policies are publicly accessible on government websites.
10
 
 
5.2.3 Utilitarian liberalism 
The main assumption of utilitarian liberalism is that a policymaker's primary interest is 
political survival - or, translated to a democratic context, re-election (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., 2003, 7-8). Therefore, policymakers choose the policy alternatives that they believe to be 
the most appealing to the electorate. The decisions to participate in the airstrike campaigns in 
Kosovo and Libya are expected to depend on the public opinion regarding these operations, as 
perceived by the policymakers. This 'perceived public opinion' will be measured in two ways. 
First, the actual public opinion can be derived from existing datasets. The public support for 
Dutch participation in the airstrike campaign in Kosovo will be derived from Philip Everts 
and Pierangelo Isernia's (2001) book on the role of public opinion in the international use of 
force - which includes the case of Kosovo and the public opinion in the Netherlands. The data 
for the Libyan case will be derived from the German Marshall Fund's (GMF) Transatlantic 
Trends 2011. 
 As the theoretical expectation is that the policymakers' perceptions of the public 
support determined their decision, the best indicator would be opinion polls that were 
conducted and published shortly before the decision was made. This would make it more 
likely that the public support that was measured by the opinion polls, is similar to what the 
policymakers perceived the public support to be at the time of the decision making. 
Unfortunately, the data for both Kosovo and Libya are from opinion polls that were conducted 
in the months after the decision whether to participate in the bombings had been made (and 
                                                          
10
 For Defensienota 1991 and Prioriteitennota 1993 see http://www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl/. For Defensienota 
2000 see https://www.overheid.nl/. For Prinsjesdagbrief 2003 and Actualiseringsbrief 2006 see  http://www. 
rijksoverheid.nl/. 
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for Kosovo there is also a poll that was conducted four months prior to the bombings). There 
is no way to completely resolve this shortcoming, but the validity of the comparison can be 
improved by using a threshold in the opinion poll data similar to the one used by Schuster and 
Maier (2006, 229). The public support between 40 and 60 per cent will be interpreted as 
'neutral', and only below 40 per cent and above 60 per cent will the public opinion be 
interpreted as being 'opposing' or 'in favor' respectively. This prevents slight changes in the 
public opinion, between the time of the decision making and the time of the opinion polls, 
from altering the outcome of the comparison completely.
11
 As a result, the likelihood that the 
measurements of the public opinion differ from the policymakers' perceptions of the public 
opinion is decreased.  
 The second measurement will concentrate on the actual expressions of the 
policymakers' perceptions. Parliamentary debates and ministerial letters regarding the 
decisions can be analyzed to uncover the policymakers' perceptions of the public opinion on 
participation in the airstrikes. If the public opinion played a role in the decision making, then 
the policymakers could have mentioned it to support their decisions in the run-up or shortly 
after these decisions were made. Together with the data of the actual public opinion, this will 
allow for the policymakers' perceptions of the public opinion to be classified as (1) 
supportive, (2) somewhat supportive, (3) neutral, (4) somewhat opposed or (5) opposed in 
regards to participation in the airstrike campaigns. When both the actual public opinion and 
the expressions of the policymakers point in the same direction - e.g. that the public was in 
favor of participation - then the resulting 'perceived public opinion' is classified as more 
supportive (or opposed) than when only one of the two indicators point in that direction (for a 
detailed explanation see Appendix B). 
 An alternative indicator of the perceived public support could have been an analysis of 
the Dutch media coverage of the two conflicts and whether the mainstream newspapers were 
opposed or supportive of Dutch participation. Although this indicator would have been 
available to the policymakers at the time of the decision making, it does not necessarily reflect 
the opinion of the electorate - while that is the essential factor in the utilitarian liberalist 
explanation. Moreover, the media coverage would not indicate how the public opinion was 
perceived by the policymakers themselves. A combination of opinion polls and expressions of 
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 Using these thresholds, the public opinion must have changed by at least 22 percentage points (from 61 per 
cent to 39 per cent) to be interpreted as in favor of participation, while it actually was opposed at the time of the 
decision making. Without the thresholds, this could be the result of much smaller changes in the public support - 
for instance from 51 per cent to 49 per cent in favor. Simultaneously, it helps the cross-case comparison as a 51 
per cent support will not be interpreted as equally in favor as a support of 61 per cent. 
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policymakers will therefore be a more reliable way of assessing the policymakers' perceptions 
of the public opinion. 
 
5.2.4 Liberal constructivism 
To evaluate the explanations of the liberal constructivist approach, two hypotheses have been 
derived. The approach assumes that policymakers choose the policy alternative that is most 
consistent with their worldview or ideological background. Since Dutch foreign policy is 
often the result of a compromise between the multiple parties in Cabinet (Kaarbo, 2012, 77-
78), both the ideological background of these parties and the coalition agreement they settled 
on are expected to determine the decisions whether to contribute to the airstrike campaigns.  
 Whether and to what extent the parties in government were ideologically opposed to 
the bombings, for the fourth hypothesis, can be derived from the manifestoes of those parties. 
Before parliamentary elections, each party publishes a new manifesto in which they express 
their ideas about nearly all possible issues (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 92). Statements on 
military interventions, their utility and whether the Netherlands should be willing and able to 
participate in them, can thus be used to determine which parties were more opposed to Dutch 
participation in NATO-led airstrike campaigns. During the Kosovo conflict, the most recent 
manifestoes were from the 1998 elections, and during the Libya conflict the manifestoes dated 
back to the 2010 elections. All manifestoes can be found in an open-access database of the 
University of Groningen.
12
 The size of the parties (in seats in parliament) and the number of 
parties in Cabinet, indicate the relative impact of the ideological backgrounds. This is used to 
determine which Cabinet should be considered to be more opposed to participation in military 
operations. 
 For the fifth hypothesis, the compromise between the governing parties with regards to 
the participation in airstrike campaigns or other multinational military operations can be 
derived from the coalition agreements (or regeerakkoorden). The problem of analyzing these 
coalition agreements is that they might not include all the possible compromises that the 
parties in Cabinet struck, and that the parties might reach new informal accords after the 
official agreement has been published. An alternative measurement would be to analyze the 
compromises that are struck in the Council of Ministers - i.e. the weekly meeting of all the 
ministers of the Cabinet - however, the minutes of these meetings are kept secret for twenty 
years, which makes them inaccessible for the cases of Kosovo and Libya. The coalition 
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 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (DNPP). Available at http://dnpp.ub.rug.nl/dnpp/. 
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agreement will therefore be used as the embodiment of the compromises between the parties 
in Cabinet. During the conflict in Kosovo, the ruling Cabinet was Kok II, which started in 
1998, and during the conflict in Libya it was Rutte I, which started in 2010. Both coalition 
agreements are publicly accessible.
13
  
 The coalition agreements, however, might not specifically mention whether the 
Netherlands should participate in military operations or which preconditions must be met for 
the Netherlands to contribute. Therefore, the stance towards participation that the coalition 
parties agreed upon, can also be derived from the statements in the coalition agreement on 
what the military should be focused on. Statements that the armed forces will be more focused 
on defending the homeland, indicates a less supportive stance regarding participation in 
international military operations than statements that the armed forces should be focused on 
protecting civilians around the globe. And when a Cabinet agrees to reduce the number of 
international operations that the armed forces should be capable of contributing to at any time, 
this would also indicate a more opposed stance towards participation in international military 
actions. If the agreement does not mention the military whatsoever, this would indicate a 
neutral stance; where the Cabinet has no ideological opposition to Dutch participation in 
military operations, nor a belief that the Netherlands should be actively involved in military 
missions. A complicating factor, however, is the fact that the 2010 coalition consisted of a 
minority government, with two separate agreements. Roughly speaking, one coalition 
agreement focused on internal affairs and the other on foreign affairs, thus the former will be 
excluded in this research. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Neorealism 
The first hypothesis is the neorealist expectation that the decision to participate in an airstrike 
campaign depends on the threat the conflict poses for the national security. The more a 
foreign conflict is perceived as threatening for a state's national security, the more likely that 
state is to take drastic measures to reduce that security threat. When the national interests are 
not at stake, a state would prefer not to get involved due to the costs and risks of military 
action (Mearsheimer, 1994-95, 29). Two measurements will be used to compare the perceived 
threat of the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya. The resulting indications of which conflict was 
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 For the 1998 agreement, see http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/rijksbegrotingsarchief/regeerakkoorden/ 
regeerakkoord_1998.pdf. For the 2010 agreement, see http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/ 
rapporten/2010/09/30/regeerakkoord-vvd-cda.html. 
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perceived as more threatening, will then be combined to give an assessment of the extent to 
which the perceptions differed.  
 First, the threat perceptions will be derived from the information the policymakers 
provided to the parliament. The measurement includes the letters and debates that were 
devoted to the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya from the moment the conflicts started, to the 
moment the NATO-led airstrikes began. The last document that is included, is thus the letter 
or debate in which the decision to participate in the bombings - or not to participate - has been 
made and is explained to the parliament by the government. Any document in which the 
parliament is informed about the conflicts after the bombings had already started is excluded, 
since the perceptions of threat that are expressed in these documents - which had likely 
changed due to the airstrike campaigns - could not have influenced the decision making.  
 For the case of Kosovo, the first ministerial letter on the conflict was on 13 March 
1998 - a few weeks after Serbia started to use military means against Albanians in Kosovo 
(De Wijk, 2000, 54) - and the NATO-led bombings started on 24 March 1999. In the Libyan 
case, the first mention of the conflict was in a VAO on 17 February 2011 and the bombings 
started on 19 March 2011. However, NATO only took full command on 31 March 2011, 
which will therefore be used as the starting date of the NATO airstrike campaign (Michaels, 
2014, 22, 25). This has resulted in 24 documents for the Kosovo case (19 ministerial letters 
and 5 VAOs) and 10 documents for the Libya case (5 letters, 3 VAOs and 2 debates). These 
can all be found on a government website, where they are publically accessible.
14
  
 Letters and debates in which the subject was related to the conflicts in Kosovo and 
Libya, but that did not cover how the conflicts affect the Netherlands, were excluded. 
Examples are a ministerial letter about the terms under which the Netherlands was willing to 
contribute to an OSCE-observation mission in Kosovo (Kamerstukken II, 1998-99a), or a 
ministerial letter in which the parliament is informed about the progress of the Rambouillet 
conference (Kamerstukken II, 1998-99b). Although the subjects of these letters are related to 
the situation in Kosovo, the duration of the OSCE mission or information about which 
countries are represented at the Rambouillet meetings, does not imply how threatening the 
conflict in itself is perceived to be. 
 In order to compare the two cases, the parliamentary documents are coded according 
to the types of concerns that are expressed by the policymakers, as explained in the 
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 Using https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/parlementaire_documenten - which is a part of https:// 
www.overheid.nl/ - it is possible to search for parliamentary documents by the dossier numbers that are linked to 
each subject. For Kosovo the dossier number is 22181, for Libya it is 32623.  
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operationalization section. Each ministerial letter, parliamentary debate or VAO can be 
ascribed to multiple categories, as concerns for the humanitarian situation, the regional 
stability and the national interest could all be expressed in a single letter or debate. For 
example, in a VAO on the situation in Kosovo on 3 June 1998, the Dutch minister of foreign 
affairs expressed his concerns for the humanitarian situation: 
"Homes are set on fire, livestock is being killed, the people are driven away or flee 
themselves. Indeed, it seems as though the Serbians try to rid the border region entirely 
of the Albanian population" (Kamerstukken II, 1997-98a, 5).
15
 
And, in that same VAO, the minister of foreign affairs also mentioned how "the danger exists 
that the civil war in Kosovo will lead to a war in the Balkans" (Kamerstukken II, 1997-98a, 
6),
16
 which can be categorized as a concern for the regional stability. An example of a 
ministerial letter in which concerns for the Dutch national security interests were expressed, is 
the letter by the minister and junior mister of foreign affairs on 25 March 2011 on the 
situation in Libya, in which they first state that the regional situation "can have consequences 
for the Dutch interests",
17
 to then elaborate on how terrorism and illegal migration might be 
fostered, how the oil and gas reserves are vital for the Dutch energy supply and how the 
Netherlands has important trade interests in the region (Kamerstukken II, 2010-11a, 1-2). 
 When all the ministerial letters, parliamentary debates and VAOs are coded into these 
three categories, the results can be shown as in table 1. While both cases were mostly 
described in terms of the humanitarian crisis in the conflict areas - the category that indicates 
a low perceived threat - there is a difference in the distribution between the two cases. Less 
than half of the concerns that were expressed about the conflict in Kosovo were focused on 
the humanitarian situation (16 out of 34), while for the Libyan case these humanitarian 
concerns amounted to two thirds of the total (10 out of 15). Furthermore, the conflict in 
Kosovo was described more in terms of a regional stability crisis than the conflict in Libya 
was (13 out of 34 against 2 out of 15); while the Libyan case was only slightly more often 
described in terms of  the national interests  that were at stake than  the Kosovo case  (3 out of  
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 The original text being: "[h]uizen worden in brand geschoten, vee wordt gedood, inwoners worden verdreven 
of vluchten zelf. Het lijkt er inderdaad soms op alsof de Serviërs dat grensgebied geheel willen ontdoen van de 
Albanese bevolking" (Kamerstukken II, 1997-98a, 5). 
16
 The original text being: "[h]et gevaar bestaat dat de burgeroorlog in Kosovo zal leiden tot een Balkanoorlog" 
(Kamerstukken II, 1997-98a, 6). 
17
 The original text being: "[h]et ontbreken van sociaaleconomisch perspectief, het wegvallen van veiligheids-
structuren, toenemende criminaliteit en het ontbreken van rechtsstatelijke waarborgen kunnen gevolgen hebben 
voor Nederlandse belangen" (Kamerstukken II, 2010-11a, 1). 
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Table 1. Ministerial letters, parliamentary debates and VAOs on the conflicts in Kosovo and 
Libya. 
  Categories of consequences 
Conflict (1) Humanitarian (2) Regional stability  (3) National interest Total Avg. 
Kosovo          47.1%   38.2%   14.7%    34 1.68 
Libya           66.7%   13.3%   20.0%    15 1.53 
Sources: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/parlementaire_documenten (see footnote 14). 
The number of times the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya were described by the government in terms of 
the humanitarian crisis (n1), the regional stability (n2) or the Dutch national interest (n3), as a 
percentage of the number times the conflicts were described in total (ntot). The averages are calculated 
using:  
Avg. = (n1*1+n2*2+n3*3)/ntot. 
The average indicates where the two conflicts would be placed on a scale from 1 to 3, where a value of 
1 would indicate that 100 per cent of the concerns were about the humanitarian crisis and a value of 3 
would indicate that 100 per cent of the concerns were about the national interest. Values below 1.667 
are classified as a low perceived threat and values above 2.333 are classified as high perceived threats 
- as defined in Appendix A. 
 
15 against 5 out of 34). The conflict in Libya thus appears to have been perceived as less of a 
threat to Dutch national security than the conflict in Kosovo. When the 'averages' are used to 
classify the perceived threat of the conflicts as low, medium or high, this difference also 
becomes visible. With the Kosovo case being valued at 1.68, it is classified as a medium 
perceived threat, while the Libyan case, with a value of 1.53, is classified as a low perceived 
threat.  
 The second measurement of the perceived national security threat consists of the 
assessments of the conflicts by the Dutch intelligence agencies: the AIVD and MIVD. How 
the two conflicts were covered by these reports is compared in terms of the percentages of the 
words that are devoted to the conflicts and in terms of the number of different consequences 
that the conflicts were listed to have. The results of these two indicators are shown in table 2. 
The percentages of the total words that are devoted to the two conflicts do not give a clear 
indication of which conflict was perceived to be a bigger threat. On average, Kosovo was 
given more attention in the AIVD and MIVD reports for 1998 and 1999 than Libya in the 
reports for 2011. However, the difference is negligible (2.51 per cent against 2.47 per cent, 
respectively). As a result, when these percentages are related to  the classification described in 
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Table 2. Annual reports of the AIVD and MIVD on the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya. 
          Average percentage 
 Annual Number of different     of words devoted to Average total 
Case reports  consequences listed     to the conflict  number of words 
Kosovo 1998, 1999  7   2.51%       16,183 
Libya 2011   4   2.47%       22,383 
Sources: AIVD, 2012; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1999; Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 2000; Militaire 
Inlichtingendienst, 1999; Militaire Inlichtingendienst, 2000; MIVD, 2012. 
 
the operationalization, this indicator classifies the perceived threat of both conflicts to be at a 
low level, as they fall below the 3.33 per cent boundary. 
 The other measurement - the number of different potential consequences for the Dutch 
national security that were listed - indicates a more considerable distinction between the two 
cases. As shown in table 2, the conflict in Kosovo was reported to have seven different 
possible consequences for the Dutch security situation, while the conflict in Libya was 
reported to have only four possible implications. The two cases were reported to have some 
similar consequences for the Netherlands - e.g. the occurrence of incidents of violence in the 
Netherlands caused by Yugoslavian and Libyan minorities, or international terrorism in 
general being fostered by the conflicts (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1999, 11; 
Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 2000, 30-31, 35; AIVD, 2012, 6, 9, 37) - but only Kosovo 
was reported to potentially lead to attacks within the Netherlands or against Dutch citizens 
and interests abroad (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst, 1999, 23-24; Militaire 
Inlichtingendienst, 2000, 2). These results support the findings of the analysis of 
parliamentary documents, as - according to the classification described in the 
operationalization - the perceived threat of the conflict in Kosovo is ranked at a medium level 
(5-9 consequences), while the perceived threat of the conflict in Libya is ranked at a low level 
(0-4 consequences).  
 Based on these three indicators, the overall conclusion is that Kosovo was indeed 
perceived to be more of a security threat than Libya. Two indicators classified the perceived 
threat of Kosovo as being at a medium level, while Libya was classified at a low level; and 
only one indicator classified the perceived threat of both conflicts to be at a low level. This 
also means, however, that the difference in the perceived threat was relatively small as neither 
conflict was perceived to be posing a high level threat to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the 
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Kosovo case was perceived as more threatening than the Libyan case and, therefore, the first 
hypothesis is confirmed. 
 
6.2 Neoliberal institutionalism 
The second hypothesis suggests that the decision of whether or not to participate in the 
NATO-led airstrike campaigns in Kosovo and Libya, depended on the perceived value of 
NATO for the Netherlands. According to neoliberal institutionalism, the costs for a state of 
restricting its freedom of action by committing to an institution should be outweighed by the 
gains that are expected to be realized through that commitment (Keohane, 2005, 259). 
Accordingly, the Dutch government is expected to have perceived the value of NATO for the 
Netherlands to be higher in 1999 than in 2011. The perceived value of NATO can be derived 
from the long-term defense policies, or Grand Strategies, that were publicized and reportedly 
operating at the times that the decisions had to be made. During the Kosovo conflict, the 
security strategy was set out in the Defensienota 1991 and the Prioriteitennota 1993. For the 
Libyan case, the Defensienota 2000, the Prinsjesdagbrief 2003, and the Actualiseringsbrief 
2006 are analyzed. 
 When the two cases are compared, the perceived value of NATO for the Netherlands 
seems to have remained fairly constant. This consistency becomes visible by looking at three 
aspects of the defense policies. First, the importance of NATO for the Netherlands is 
expressed in near identical terms in each publication. Despite the end of the Cold War, NATO 
was considered to be of "undiminished importance" in 1991; as the organization bound the 
United States to the European continent, which was considered to be "indispensable" to 
maintain peace and security in Europe (Defensienota 1991, 1990-91, 21).
18
 Moreover, in 
1993, NATO was called to be "an indispensible pillar of the Dutch security policy" 
(Prioriteitennota 1993, 1992-93, 4).
19
 In comparison, during the Libya conflict, the security 
strategy was less oriented on the American presence on the European continent, but it still 
stated that NATO "guarantees the Dutch territorial integrity" (Defensienota 2000, 1999-2000, 
5).
20
 In 2003, NATO was called "the most important pillar of the Dutch security policy" 
(Prinsjesdagbrief 2003, 2003, 11), and in 2006 NATO was described - in less nationalistic 
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 The original text being: "de nauwe betrokkenheid van de Verenigde Staten bij de Europese veiligheid, die tot 
uitdrukking komt in hun lidmaatschap van de Navo, blijft onverminderd van belang. De Verenigde Staten zijn 
politiek en militair onmisbaar voor het handhaven van vrede en veiligheid in Europa" (Defensienota 1991, 1990-
91, 21). 
19
 The original text being: "[d]e Navo blijft een onmisbare pijler van het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid" 
(Prioriteitennota 1993, 1992-93, 4). 
20
 The original text being: "[d]e Navo waarborgt onze territoriale integriteit" (Defensienota 2000, 1999-2000, 
15). 
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terms - as "continuously developing as an alliance that brings stability even far beyond its 
own territory" (Actualiseringsbrief 2006, 2006, 6).
21
 No considerable change has thus 
occurred between the two cases, in the terms in which the importance of NATO for the 
Netherlands is described. 
 The second aspect of the defense policies that remained fairly constant, is the way 
NATO is valued in respect to alternative institutions. Although European defense cooperation 
and bilateral defense cooperation with neighboring countries have steadily developed from 
1991 to 2011, the way in which their function was described in relation to NATO remained 
largely the same. Bilateral defense cooperation - e.g. army divisions made up of Dutch and 
German soldiers - is seen as a way to improve the cooperation within NATO (Prioriteitennota 
1993, 1992-93, 20; Defensienota 2000, 1999-2000, 30). And European defense cooperation is 
seen as the European pillar within the transatlantic alliance (Prioriteitennota 1993, 1992-93, 
10-11), as it should not go at the expense of NATO (Defensienota 1991, 1990-91, 27; 
Defensienota 2000, 1999-2000, 31), and it is argued to be complementary - and not an 
alternative - to NATO (Prinsjesdagbrief 2003, 2003, 12-13). The third sign of continuity, is 
the fact that every new security strategy was either made in close consultation with NATO 
(Defensienota 1991, 1990-91, 6; Prioriteitennota 1993, 1992-93, 4; Prinsjesdagbrief 2003, 
2003, 1), or the changes were made to conform with new agreements within NATO 
(Defensienota 2000, 1999-2000, 21; Actualiseringsbrief 2006, 2006, 2-3,7).  
 By analyzing the long-term defense policies of the Netherlands, large changes do not 
seem to have occurred in the perceived value of NATO for the Netherlands. NATO continued 
to be described as the most important institution for the security of the Netherlands, while 
other forms of defense cooperation have remained to be viewed as a way to improve the 
functionality of NATO, and, finally, NATO was involved each time changes were made to the 
Dutch security strategy. The Dutch government's perception of NATO appears to have been 
largely constant in 1999 and 2011. As a result, the different decisions as to whether to 
participate in the NATO-led airstrike campaigns in Kosovo and Libya were not preceded by a 
decline in the perceived value of NATO. The second hypothesis is thus rejected.  
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 The original texts being: "[d]e Navo is de belangrijkste pijler van het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid en 
belichaamt de transatlantische band" (Prinsjesdagbrief 2003, 2003, 11) and "[d]e Navo ontwikkelt zich verder 
als een bondgenootschap dat tot ver buiten het eigen grondgebied stabiliteit brengt" (Actualiseringsbrief 2006, 
2006, 6). 
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6.3 Utilitarian liberalism 
The third hypothesis stems from the utilitarian liberalist approach, in which policymakers are 
believed to be primarily interested in remaining in power. In their pursuit of political survival, 
policymakers are then expected to act in accordance to the preferences of the selectorate, i.e. 
those with the power to reappoint them (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 7-8). In the 
Netherlands, this selectorate constitutes of the Dutch electorate, which means that the 
policymakers are expected to choose the policy alternative that they believe to be most 
favored by the public opinion. To test this hypothesis, the perceived public support for Dutch 
participation in the airstrike campaigns in Kosovo and Libya will be measured in two ways. 
First, the actual public support can be derived from public opinion polls that were held at the 
times of the two conflicts. To improve this comparison, a threshold will be used where a 
support between 40 per cent and 60 per cent is interpreted as being neutral.
22
 And, second, the 
policymakers' expressions in parliamentary documents can be analyzed to compare how they 
perceived the public support to be during the two cases.  
 Four months before the airstrike campaign in Kosovo started, the Dutch public was 
asked in a study conducted by NIPO whether the Netherlands should participate in a potential 
NATO-led intervention in Kosovo, regardless of Dutch soldiers being killed (Everts & 
Isernia, 2001, 131). During the airstrike campaign, the question changed to "should the 
Netherlands go on participating in actions against Yugoslavia, also when casualties occur 
among its own soldiers" (Everts & Isernia, 2001, 131). During the airstrike campaign in 
Libya, the Dutch public was asked by the GMF's study to what extent they would support or 
oppose an intervention by the Dutch government to protect civilians in Libya (GMF, 2011, 
82). The results are shown in table 3. In both cases, the respondents were found to be in favor 
of the Netherlands participating in the international intervention. Only in November 1998 - 
four months before the bombings in Kosovo started - did the support not exceed the 60 per 
cent threshold. During both the campaigns, however, the support was nearly identical: for 
Kosovo it was 68 per cent and 67 per cent, and for Libya it was 68 per cent in favor of Dutch 
participation. This indicates that the public opinion was not more opposed to Dutch 
participation in Libya than it was to Dutch participation in Kosovo. 
 However, the questions were not completely identical in both cases, and neither 
specifically mentioned participation in NATO-led airstrikes. Therefore, questions about 
support for  the intervention in general and for sending Dutch ground troops are also shown in 
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 See footnote 11. 
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Table 3. Public support for Dutch participation in the airstrike campaigns in Kosovo and 
Libya. 
   Support for: 
   Dutch participation  The NATO   Sending Dutch  
Case Polling date in the intervention
a
  intervention
b
  ground troops
c
  
Kosovo  Nov. 1998  58%   
 Apr. 1999  68%        78%          58% 
 June 1999  67%  
Libya May-June 2011 68%        65%          57% 
Sources: Everts & Isernia, 2001, 131, 234, 254, 257-258; GMF, 2011, 81-81, 86. 
The percentages of respondents who gave affirmative answers to the respective questions. Where 
necessary, the answer categories strongly support and somewhat support, and strongly oppose and 
somewhat oppose were combined.  
a
 The exact questions were: Nov. 1998: "Suppose a military intervention by NATO in Kosovo will be decided 
upon. Should the Netherlands participate in such an intervention, even when it is almost certain that its own 
soldiers will be killed or wounded?" (N=Unknown) (Everts & Isernia, 2001, 131); Apr. 1999 and June 1999: 
"Should the Netherlands go on participating in actions against Yugoslavia, also when casualties occur among its 
own soldiers?" (Apr. N=980 and June N=897) (Everts & Isernia, 2001, 131); May-June 2011: "There are 
different ways to address the current situation in Libya, for each of the following, please tell me to what extent 
you support or oppose the [Dutch] government taking the following actions: Intervening to protect civilians 
(strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose)" (N=1000) (GMF, 2011, 82). 
b
 The exact questions were: Apr. 1999: "Do you support the military actions against Serbia?" (N=Unknown) 
(Everts & Isernia, 2001, 254, 257); May-June 2011: "As you may know, international forces have been engaged 
in military action in Libya. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of the military action in Libya by 
international forces? (approve very much, approve somewhat, disapprove somewhat, disapprove very much)" 
(N=1000) (GMF, 2011, 81). 
c
 The exact question text for Apr. 1999 is unknown, but it is described as along the lines of: should the 
Netherlands commit its troops if NATO decides to dispatch ground troops? (N=251) (Everts & Isernia, 2001, 
234, 258). The exact question for May-June 2011 was: "There are different ways to address the current situation 
in Libya, for each of the following, please tell me to what extent you support or oppose the [Dutch] government 
taking the following actions: Sending [Dutch] ground troops to assist the rebels who oppose president Qaddafi 
(strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly oppose)" (N=1000) (GMF, 2011, 86). 
 
table 3. The results support the conclusion that the public opinion was not considerably more 
opposed to Dutch participation in Libya than to participation in Kosovo. In both cases, the 
Dutch respondents were supportive of the NATO intervention in general (78 per cent for 
Kosovo, 65 per cent for Libya), and in both cases the support for sending Dutch ground troops 
was slightly below the 60 per cent threshold (58 per cent for Kosovo, 57 per cent for Libya). 
The actual public opinion thus appears to have been equally supportive to participating in the 
bombings in Libya as to participating in the bombings in Kosovo.  
 Nevertheless, it could be possible that the policymakers had perceived the public 
support to be significantly different in the two cases. Indications for such perceptions are 
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derived from the parliamentary documents regarding the conflicts in Kosovo and Libya. In the 
ministerial letters, parliamentary debates and VAOs that were used to test the first hypothesis 
- which excluded documents dating from after the decision whether to participate in the 
bombings had been made - the public opinion was not mentioned by the policymakers a single 
time. When the measurement is expanded to include the letters and debates that took place 
after the bombings started, the public opinion is only mentioned in the case of Kosovo. On 22 
March 2000, the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defense 
sent a letter to parliament in which the Dutch actions in the NATO-intervention were 
evaluated. They mentioned how the public opinion, the parliament and the government had 
been in agreement on the issue (Kamerstukken II, 1999-2000, 3). In the parliamentary debate 
that followed this ministerial letter, prime minister Wim Kok elaborated on that statement:  
"In the third week of March last year, there was no alternative for military action. 
Doing nothing was not an option. The parliament, the public opinion and the 
government were like-minded both before and during the crisis in Kosovo. This has 
been of great significance" (Handelingen II, 1999-2000, 5003).
23
 
However, as these statements were made one year after the airstrike campaign had 
commenced, this does not necessarily indicate that the policymakers perceived the public 
opinion to be supportive at the time that the decision was made. For the case of the Libya 
conflict, no such statements have been made. In both cases the perceptions of the public 
opinion will thus be classified as 'somewhat supportive' - where the opinion polls indicate a 
public opinion that was in favor, but the policymakers did not mention the public opinion at 
the time of the decision making. 
 This means that there is no evidence that confirms the hypothesis. Why the 
policymakers did not mention the public opinion in relation to the Libya crisis remains 
speculative. On the one hand, it could mean that public opinion did not play any role in the 
decision making, but - at the polar opposite - it could also mean that policymakers do not wish 
to reveal that they base their decision making entirely on public perception. The exact reason, 
however, is not necessarily relevant, as the expectation was that the public opinion was 
perceived by the policymakers to be less supportive in the case of Libya, which would then 
have influenced the decision making. No indications have been found that confirm this 
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 The original text being: "[i]n de derde week van maart vorig jaar was er geen alternatief meer voor militair 
ingrijpen. Niets doen was geen optie. Het parlement, de publieke opinie en de regering hebben voorafgaand en 
tijdens de Kosovocrisis een grote mate van eensgezindheid getoond. Dat is van cruciale betekenis geweest" 
(Handelingen II, 1999-2000, 5003). 
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expectation. In the first place, the actual public opinion was not more opposed in the Libya 
case, and, moreover, when the government justified the decision not to participate in the 
bombings, it never used public opposition as an argument. The only indication of public 
opinion playing a role in the decision making is that it was used as an argument to justify the 
decision to participate in the bombing campaign in Kosovo, one year after that decision had 
been made. However, this is not enough to conclude that the public support for Dutch 
participation in the airstrike campaign in Kosovo was perceived to be higher than the support 
for Dutch participation in the airstrike campaign in Libya. Therefore, the third hypothesis 
cannot be confirmed, and is rejected. 
 
6.4 Liberal constructivism 
The fourth and fifth hypotheses are derived from the liberal constructivist approach. As the 
approach assumes the decision making to depend on the worldviews or ideological 
backgrounds of the policymakers, the fourth hypothesis expects that the parties in Cabinet in 
2011 were more ideologically opposed to Dutch participation in the bombings than the parties 
in Cabinet in 1999. This hypothesis will be tested by comparing the parties' manifestoes from 
1998 and 2010. The fifth hypothesis expects the difference between the two Cabinets to lie in 
the coalition agreements, since the decisions of a multiparty coalition are based on the 
compromise between the parties in Cabinet, instead of on the beliefs of one party. If the 
parties in Cabinet, both in 1999 and in 2011, disagreed on the topic of Dutch participation in 
military interventions, it could still be possible that the different Cabinets settled on entirely 
different compromises. 
 During the conflict in Kosovo, the Netherlands was governed by the second 'Purple' 
Cabinet, led by Wim Kok. Starting in August 1998, it consisted of the social democratic PvdA 
(Partij van de Arbeid) with 45 of the 150 seats in parliament, the 'conservative-liberal' VVD 
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie) with 38 seats in parliament and the 'progressive-
liberal' D66 (Democraten 1966) with 14 seats in parliament (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, 63).
24
 
Of these three parties, the VVD is the only party that was also part of the Cabinet during the 
conflict in Libya. Starting in October 2010, this Cabinet, led by Mark Rutte, included the 
VVD with 31 seats in parliament and the Christian democratic CDA (Christen-Democratisch 
Appèl) with 21 seats in parliament. This minority government (with only 52 out of the 150 
seats in parliament) was supported on immigration and domestic security policies by the 
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 "Kabinet-Kok II (1998-2002)" Parlement en Politiek. Available at http://www.parlement.com/id/ 
vh8lnhronvx4/kabinet_kok_ii_1998_2002. [Accessed 9 May 2015]. 
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'right-wing populist' PVV (Partij Voor de Vrijheid), but the PVV was not included in the 
Cabinet.
25
 Therefore, the PVV was not involved in the decision making regarding the conflict 
in Libya. In fact, the parties in Cabinet - despite forming a minority - were the only parties 
involved in the decision making regarding Libya, according to the minister of foreign affairs 
(Kamerstukken II, 2010-11b, 32). The comparison will therefore only include these two 
coalition parties. 
 In none of the manifestoes did a party declare to be against Dutch participation in 
military operations. However, the manifestoes do differ, albeit more subtly. In general, the 
coalition parties in 1999 were more reserved about supporting participation than the parties in 
2011 (see table 4). The largest party in Cabinet in 1999, the PvdA, referred to military 
intervention on humanitarian grounds as being both of limited effectiveness and of 
controversial legitimacy (PvdA, 1998, 66-67). Nevertheless, they argued that the Netherlands 
should be prepared to contribute to peace operations (either led by NATO or the UN), 
provided that there is a solid mandate (PvdA, 1998, 67). Finally, they argued that peaceful 
alternatives should be taken more seriously (PvdA, 1998, 67). The second largest party in 
Cabinet in 1999, the VVD, argued that the Dutch foreign policy should be primarily aimed at 
protecting Dutch citizens and Dutch territory (VVD, 1998, 41). Regarding military operations 
and possible Dutch participation, they stated that the Netherlands has a responsibility to 
contribute to international peace and security, but that "participation in operations by 
international organizations should only take place when there is enough clarity about the 
goals, the responsibilities and the sufficiency of both the mandate and the necessary means" 
(VVD, 1998, 41).
26
 Finally, the smallest party in Cabinet in 1999, D66, considered 
international peace and security to be something that should be more the responsibility of the 
European Union - and not of the individual member states - and that peaceful alternatives to 
military action should be given more attention (D66, 1998, para. 504, 506, 507, 552). 
However, they also argued that NATO should play a larger role in peace operations outside its 
territory, and that the Netherlands should participate in such operations (D66, 1998, para. 556, 
557).  
 In comparison, in 2011 the VVD - the only party that was part of both Cabinets - was 
slightly more supportive of Dutch participation in  military operations. This time as the largest  
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 "Kabinet-Rutte I (2010-2012)" Parlement en Politiek. Available at http://www.parlement.com/id/ 
vij7e8jky5lw/kabinet_rutte_i_2010_2012; "Vrijheid en Verantwoordelijkheid" Parlement en Politiek. Available 
at http://www.parlement.com/id/vj4dfrcua0wl/vrijheid_en_verantwoordelijkheid. [Accessed 9 May 2015]. 
26
 The original text being: "[d]eelname aan acties van internationale organisaties moet alleen plaatsvinden bij 
voldoende duidelijkheid over de doelstellingen, de verantwoordelijkheden en over de toereikendheid van het 
verstrekte mandaat en de in te zetten middelen" (VVD, 1998, 41). 
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Table 4. Statements from the manifestoes of the parties in Cabinet during the conflicts in 
Kosovo and Libya. 
   Responsi-     
   bility to  View on military  Preconditions for 
Case Party (seats) participate operations   participation 
Kosovo PvdA (45) Yes  - Limited usefulness  - Solid mandate 
     and legitimacy is 
     controversial.  
     - More focus on 
      peaceful alternatives 
 VVD (38) Yes  -Protecting the  - Clarity about goals,  
     national interest  responsibilities,  
     comes first   mandate and means 
 D66   (14) Yes  - EU should take   - None 
     more responsibility 
     - NATO should  
     play a bigger role. 
     - More focus on 
     peaceful alternatives 
 
Libya VVD (31) Yes  - Participation is in the - None 
     national interest 
 CDA (21) Yes  - Foreign policy should - End date should depend 
     be aimed at protecting on the goals and the 
     human rights and furthering  accomplishments of the 
     international law  operation 
Sources: PvdA, 1998; VVD, 1998; D66, 1998; VVD, 2010; CDA, 2010. 
 
party in Cabinet, the VVD wished to end the annual cuts in the defense budget, since they 
feared that the armed forces would no longer be able to effectively participate in peace 
operations (VVD, 2010, 39). Similar to their statements in 1998, they mentioned that the 
Netherlands should contribute proportionally to peace operations, but this time they did not 
mention any preconditions (VVD, 2010, 39). Furthermore, they argued that it is in the 
national interest to participate in operations that are led by NATO, and, if possible, mandated 
by the UN Security Council (VVD, 2010, 40). The other party in Cabinet, the CDA, put great 
emphasis on the importance of an active foreign policy in relation to international 
organizations - including NATO - and they stated that foreign policy should be aimed at 
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protecting human rights and furthering international law (CDA, 2010, para. 11, 11.1.1, 
11.1.3). About participation in military operations specifically, they only mentioned that "the 
Netherlands participates in international missions and crisis-control operations around the 
world",
27
 and the only precondition mentioned is that the end date of such missions should not 
be rigid and 'short-term' but should instead be dependent on the goals and accomplishments of 
the operation (CDA, 2010, para. 11.1.7).  
 Since all five party manifestoes were supportive of Dutch participation in military 
intervention, there are no indications supporting the argument that the Cabinet in 2011 was 
more ideologically opposed to participation than the Cabinet in 1999. If anything, the 2010 
manifestoes appeared to be slightly more in favor of Dutch participation than the 1998 
manifestoes. In 1998, the two largest parties (83 seats combined) only agreed to participation 
under certain preconditions, and 2010 this was only the case for one party (21 seats). 
Moreover, the largest party of the Cabinet in 1998 was rather skeptical about military 
interventions, while the largest party in 2010 referred to Dutch participation in such 
operations as being in the national interest. And finally, only in 1998 did parties express the 
need to take peaceful alternatives to military operations more seriously into consideration. 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis, that the parties in Cabinet in 2011 were more ideologically 
opposed to participation in military operations than the parties in Cabinet in 1999, is rejected. 
 Both coalition agreements, which are compared to test the fifth hypothesis, have a few 
paragraphs devoted to the Dutch foreign policy, the Dutch role within international 
institutions and to what extent the Netherlands is willing and able to participate in military 
interventions (see table 5). In the 1998 agreement, the Cabinet expressed its desire to honor 
NATO-agreements and it recognized that NATO will be more oriented towards preventing 
and containing violent conflicts. About these operations, the Cabinet then stated that: "the 
Netherlands remains to be prepared to contribute to them" (Regeerakkoord 1998, 1998, 83).
28
 
Finally, the Cabinet wished to maintain the level of ambition (i.e. the number of operations 
the armed forces should be capable of carrying out at any time) which meant that the defense 
budget had to stay at a "reasonable level" (Regeerakkoord 1998, 1998, 83).  
 In contrast, the 2010 coalition agreement was more restrained in regards to supporting 
Dutch participation in  military operations. Again the  Cabinet expressed its desire to fulfill its  
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 The original text being: "Nederland neemt deel aan internationale missies en crisisbeheersingsoperaties 
wereldwijd" (CDA, 2010, para. 11.1.7). 
28
 The original text being: "Naast de klassieke verdedigingstaak is het van toenemend belang dat het 
bondgenootschap een actieve rol speelt in het voorkomen en indammen van conflicten die de internationale 
stabiliteit en veiligheid bedreigen. Nederland houdt vast aan de bereidheid om daaraan een bijdrage te leveren" 
(Regeerakkoord 1998, 1998, 83). 
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Table 5. Statements on Dutch participation in military operations from the coalition 
agreements of 1998 and 2010. 
   Should NL  Is NL prepared  To what extent 
   play an active  to contribute to  should NL be capa- 
Cabinet  role in NATO? NATO operations?  ble to contribute? 
Kosovo - Kok II Yes   Yes     Maintain level of 
(1998-2002)         ambition 
Libya - Rutte I Yes   Depends on the   Reduce level of 
(2010-2012)     international obligations ambition 
      and the national interest 
Sources: Ministry of Defense, 2010; Regeerakkoord 1998, 1998; Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010. 
 
responsibilities within the EU and NATO (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 7). However, this time 
it also declared that:  
"The current international challenges and conflicts, together with the Dutch financial 
and economic situation, necessitate both more careful considerations in the external 
policy and to adopt an integrated policy" (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 7).
29
  
The agreement then elaborates on this statement, by mentioning that requests by NATO or the 
EU to participate in military operations will be weighed against the Dutch international 
obligations and the national interests, and that these missions should be partly financed from 
the budget for development aid (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 8). Finally, the Cabinet wished to 
change the level of ambition of the armed forces in accordance to the findings of an 
exploratory study by the ministry of defense (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 9). Although the 
coalition agreement did not specifically mention which conclusions of the 317-page-long 
report should be adopted, the study's main findings on the level of ambition were that the 
distinction between low-intensity and high-intensity operations is outdated and that the armed 
forces will have to concentrate more on domestic security issues in the future (Ministry of 
Defense, 2010, 210-211). Since the 2010 coalition agreement was more hesitant to accept 
requests to contribute to NATO-led operations and it also declared to reduce the level of 
ambition of the armed forces, it is considered to be less supportive of Dutch participation in 
                                                          
29
 "Integrated policy" is later explained as closer cooperation between the departments of defense, justice, police 
and development aid (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 8). The original text being: "De huidige internationale 
uitdagingen en conflicten en de Nederlandse financieel-economische situatie maken het noodzakelijk scherpere 
keuzes te maken in het externe beleid en om geïntegreerd beleid te voeren" (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 7). 
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an airstrike campaign than the coalition agreement of 1998. The fifth hypothesis is therefore 
confirmed. 
 
7. Process tracing 
The results indicate that the conflict in Kosovo was perceived by the Dutch government as a 
bigger threat to the national security than the conflict in Libya. Simultaneously, the perceived 
value of NATO remained fairly consistent and the public opinion was equally in favor of 
Dutch participation in the operations in both Kosovo and Libya. And while the parties in 
Cabinet in 2011 were not more ideologically opposed to Dutch participation in military 
interventions than the parties in Cabinet in 1999, the 2011 coalition agreement was in fact less 
supportive of participation than the 1999 agreement. Curiously, the findings of the last two 
hypotheses seem to contradict each other. When two parties largely agree on an issue, they are 
not expected to settle on a compromise that does not fit either party's initial preferences 
(Kaarbo, 2012, 4-6). This last section of the article will therefore be devoted to examining 
why this appears to have been the case for the Cabinet in 2011. To answer this article's main 
question, it is not sufficient to conclude that a 'pro-intervention' government reacted with 
military action to what they perceived to be a national security threat; while a Cabinet that 
was less supportive of participation in interventions responded to a lower security threat 
without resorting to the use of force. Instead, the causes and effects need to be linked together. 
It is important to understand why the 2011 Cabinet was less supportive of participation, as 
this also affects what the government considered to be the appropriate response to a security 
threat.  
 A possible explanation for the coalition agreement in 2011 being less supportive of 
participation, is the role of the PVV as the supporting or 'tolerating' party (gedoogpartij in 
Dutch). The PVV was markedly opposed to Dutch participation in military operations. In their 
2010 manifesto they stated that "in the future, the Netherlands should only participate in 
peace operations in an extremely limited sense" (PVV, 2010, 41).
30
 However, the party's role 
in the construction of the coalition agreement was limited. The Cabinet parties (VVD and 
CDA) did sign an 'agreement of tolerance' (gedoogakkoord) with the PVV about policies on 
immigration, policing and elderly care. However, foreign policy was part the actual coalition 
agreement, which was not supported by the PVV (Van Holsteyn, 2011, 418; Vermeend, 2010, 
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 The original text being: "Nederland moet in de toekomst slechts in zeer beperkte mate meedoen met 
vredesmissies" (PVV, 2010, 41). 
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chapter 5). The coalition agreement was an accord between the VVD and CDA, and the PVV 
could vote against policies from that agreement (Regeerakkoord 2010, 2010, 4). Therefore, 
the 2010 agreement was not less supportive of Dutch participation in military operations due 
to the PVV; instead it was more likely the result of the added constraints of the coalition 
parties forming a minority in parliament.  
 Since ideologically differing parties have to reach an agreement in a multiparty 
government, the foreign policy of such coalitions suffers from constraints and restrictions that 
do not exist in single-party governments. Therefore the dominant view within the coalition 
politics approach is that the foreign policy of multiparty governments is more "peaceful" than 
that of single-party governments (Kaarbo, 2012, 8-9). According to this logic, the larger the 
number of parties that have to be consulted to make a decision, the harder it gets for all parties 
to agree on something as controversial as the use of military force (Kaarbo & Beasley, 2008, 
68-69). This should particularly be the case for minority governments, as they need a part of 
the opposition to support their decisions. This is illustrated by the decision of the minority 
Cabinet in 2011 to start a mission to train the police in Afghanistan. That decision required 
the support of four opposition parties, which resulted in the interdiction of the use of force in 
the eventual mission.
31
  
 When deciding on its foreign policy, the minority Cabinet of 2010 was restricted by 
the fact that their decisions would not automatically be supported by the parliament. To 
preserve the fragile coalition, such a Cabinet needs to avoid making controversial decisions 
(Kaarbo, 2012, 9). And while the use of military force in itself can be considered 
controversial, it is even more the case when the threat to the national security is perceived to 
be low. This indicates that the coalition agreement of 2010 might have been less supportive of 
Dutch participation in military intervention than the Cabinet parties would have preferred it to 
be, because the reliance on the support of opposition parties made a peaceful foreign policy 
more feasible. 
 In comparison, the Cabinet of 1999 was noticeably more prone to resort to the use of 
military force, despite the fact that the manifestoes of two of the three coalition parties 
emphasized a more peaceful foreign policy. Just one month after the Cabinet took office, it 
had already stated that the crisis in Kosovo could only be resolved by threatening to use 
military force against the Serbians (Kamerstukken II, 1997-98b, 3). Since these coalition 
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 "Meerderheid Kamer steunt 'papieren' missie Kunduz" NRC (28 January 2011). Available at http:// 
www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/01/28/meerderheid-kamer-steunt-missie-kunduz/ [Accessed 9 May 2015]; "Politie-
missie naar Kunduz gaat door" De Volkskrant (28 January 2011). Available at http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-
vk-dossier-de-missie-naar-kunduz/politiemissie-naar-kunduz-gaat-door~a1828891/. [Accessed 9 May 2015]. 
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parties did form a majority in parliament, the Cabinet could take this more aggressive stance 
without needing the support of other parties. And while the willingness to use force might 
stem from the conflict being perceived as more threatening to the national security, it was the 
majority in parliament that made the Cabinet more capable to actually use it. Although the 
difference between the two coalition agreements was expected from a liberal constructivist 
standpoint, this difference does not seem to be the result of ideological motives. Instead the 
minority government of 2010 had to adopt a more feasible, peaceful foreign policy than their 
manifestoes would have suggested, in order to preserve the Cabinet. By contrast, the 
parliamentary majority of the 1998 coalition gave the government more freedom of maneuver, 
as it did not rely on the consent of the opposition. 
 
8. Conclusion and discussion 
In an attempt to better understand the decision of small states to participate in military 
operations, this article set out to explain why the Netherlands took part in the NATO-led 
bombings in Kosovo in 1999, but not in the NATO-led bombings in Libya in 2011. As these 
two cases shared some fundamental characteristics - e.g. both were led by NATO, both were 
limited to aerial operations and both were aimed at protecting civilians - a controlled 
comparison could be made. In this most similar systems design, the theoretical expectations of 
four different approaches were applied to explain the different policy outcomes in 1999 and 
2011. From the neorealist approach, the conflict in Kosovo was expected to have been 
perceived as a bigger threat to Dutch national security, than the conflict in Libya. The 
neoliberal institutionalist expectation was that the value of NATO was perceived to be lower 
in 2011 than in 1999, and the utilitarian liberalist approach expected the public support for 
participation in the bombings to have been perceived as lower in 2011. Finally, from the 
liberal constructivist approach two hypotheses were derived. One suggested that the parties in 
Cabinet in 2010 were more ideologically opposed to Dutch participation in the airstrike 
campaigns than the parties in Cabinet in 1999. And the other expectation was that the 
coalition agreement of the 2011 Cabinet was less supportive of participation than the coalition 
agreement of the 1999 Cabinet.  
 Only the neorealist hypothesis and the second liberal constructivist hypothesis were 
confirmed by the evidence. The conflict in Kosovo was thus perceived as a bigger threat to 
the national security than the conflict in Libya, while the Cabinet in 1999 had agreed to be 
more supportive of Dutch participation in international military operations than the Cabinet in 
43 
2011 had agreed to be. The perceived value of NATO was found to have remained constant 
between the two cases and no indications were found that the public support for participation 
was perceived to be lower in the case of Libya than in the case of Kosovo. Remarkably, the 
parties in Cabinet were not more ideologically opposed to Dutch participation in military 
operation in 2011 than in 1999, yet they did sign a coalition agreement that was less 
supportive of foreign intervention. This can be explained by the restricted freedom of 
maneuver of the 2011 coalition, which was composed of parties holding only 52 out of the 
150 seats in parliament. Since the foreign policy of the Cabinet needed the support of 
opposition parties, the foreign policy was more 'peaceful' - and thus more feasible to gain 
majority support - than what would be expected based on their manifestoes.  
 In conclusion, the Netherlands did participate in the NATO-led airstrike campaign in 
Kosovo in 1999 but not in Libya in 2011 because the conflict in Libya was perceived to be 
less threatening to Dutch national interests and because the Cabinet was less open to 
participation in 2011 than in 1999. The more peaceful foreign policy stance of 2011, however, 
cannot be traced back to the parties' ideological beliefs, but was more the result of pragmatic 
considerations. It seems as though the capability to use military force depends on the coalition 
parties forming a majority in parliament, while the willingness to use force relies on the 
perceived danger of the situation. However, questions whether the 2011 government would 
have responded differently to a more threatening conflict - such as the one in Kosovo - or 
whether the 1999 coalition would have participated in the airstrike campaign in Libya as well, 
remain unanswered. Based on this study, it is not possible to conclude whether the decision of 
small states to participate in international military operations is mostly dependent on the 
perceived threat of the conflict, the compromises in the coalition agreement, or the 
combination of both. 
 This could be the subject for future studies, in which more evidence of how the parties 
in Cabinet reached their compromises could be obtained from the minutes of the weekly 
meetings of the Council of Ministers. These minutes are kept secret for twenty years, as 
previously noted, and remain inaccessible for the time being. The testing of the third 
hypothesis could have also been improved, had opinion polls been available that were 
conducted and published shortly before the decisions whether to participate were made. This 
would have provided a more accurate indication of how the policymakers perceived the public 
support for participation in the airstrike campaigns. Cases where these data are available 
could be used in future studies, to support - or refute - the findings of this research. By 
including a larger number of cases, those studies could also identify to what extent larger 
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differences between the cases - e.g. in the perceived level of threat - have a different effect 
compared to a small degree of variance. With only two cases, it cannot be determined 
whether, for instance, low, medium and high degrees of perceived threat would each lead to a 
different expected policy outcome. Therefore, to improve the understanding of the foreign 
policy of small states regarding participation in military interventions, more research is 
needed.  
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10 Appendices 
10.1 Appendix A: Classification of the threat perceptions based on parliamentary documents. 
For each conflict, the parliamentary documents can be categorized as focusing on one or more 
of three possible aspects of the conflict: (1) the humanitarian situation, (2) the regional 
stability, or (3) the national interests. This results in a certain distribution of the parliamentary 
documents across these categories (for example, 25% are humanitarian concerns, 25% are 
concerns about the regional stability and 50% of the concerns are about the national interests). 
 To classify this distribution as a low, medium or high threat, the 'average' way in 
which the conflict is described is calculated. When the values 1, 2 and 3 are attributed to 
concerns about the humanitarian situation, concerns about the regional stability and concerns 
about the national interests respectively, the average will always be between the values 1 and 
3 - where a value of 1 would indicate that policymakers’ concerns were exclusively about the 
humanitarian crisis and a value of 3 would indicate the concerns were entirely about Dutch 
national security interests. The perceived threat of a conflict is then considered to be at a low 
level when the average falls within the first tertile (between 1 and 1.67), it is considered to be 
at a medium level when the average is within the second tertile (between 1.67 and 2.33), and 
when the average is within the third tertile (between 2.33 and 3) the perceived threat of the 
conflict is considered to be at a high level. 
 In the case of the distribution that was given as an example, the average is 2.25, as 25 
concerns - of the 100 in total - are about the humanitarian situation (25 1), 25 concerns are 
about the regional stability (25 2), and 50 concerns are about the national interests (50 3). 
Together that makes 225, which - divided by 100 - results in an average of 2.25. The 
perceived threat in this example is thus considered to be at a medium level.  
 The problem with this classification is that by attributing the values to the three 
categories, this ordinal variable is treated as an interval variable. This means that the 
difference in perceived threat between humanitarian concerns and regional stability concerns 
is treated as equal to the difference between regional stability concerns and national interest 
concerns. As a result, the value of the average has little meaning by itself, and can only be 
used to objectively rank the distributions (and not for any statistical analysis). This is also 
why only three ranks are used (low, medium and high), since five or seven ranks would 
require a precision that is not provided by using this 'average'. 
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10.2 Appendix B: Classification of the perceived public support. 
The data from the opinion polls and from the parliamentary documents are used to classify the 
policymakers' perceptions of the public opinion as being (1) supportive, (2) somewhat 
supportive, (3) neutral, (4) somewhat opposed or (5) opposed to Dutch participation in the 
airstrike campaigns.  
 The opinion polls indicate whether a public opinion is in favor (61%-100%), neutral 
(40%-60%) or opposed of participation (0%-39%). And, simultaneously, in the parliamentary 
documents the policymakers can either mention the public opinion to be in favor of, or 
opposed to participation - or they do not mention the public opinion at all. 
 This results in a total of nine possible combinations, as shown in table B1. When both 
indicators point in the same direction, then the perceptions of the public opinion are 
considered to have been more supportive - or more opposed - than when only one indicator 
points in that direction. When the two indicators contradict each other, or when both 
indicators are neutral, then the perceptions of the public opinion are considered to have been 
neither supportive nor opposed - or, in other words, neutral. 
 
Table B1. Possible combinations of public opinion polls and policymakers' expressions, and 
the resulting classification of the perceptions of the public opinion. 
     Policymakers' expressions 
Opinion Polls    In favor   None    Opposed 
In favor    (1) Supportive  (2) Somewhat supportive (3) Neutral 
Neutral    (2) Somewhat supportive (3) Neutral   (4) Somewhat  
          opposed 
Opposed    (3) Neutral   (4) Somewhat opposed (5) Opposed 
 
 
